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Abstract Historians try to interpret the past by analysing patterns in human
behaviour in earlier periods of time. In some ways, that excludes ‘coincidence’ as a
mode of interpretation. Most historians view coincidences as closely related events
that lack causal relationship. That type of coincidence does not ﬁt into a historical
narrative, because historians tend to focus on causality, action, and consequence.
This is noticeably linked to questions of historical scale: the choice for the scale of a
speciﬁc narrative decides whether certain events are coincidental to the history
which is being described, or causal factors within that history. This relation between
historical coincidence and the scale of writing history is at the centre of this con-
tribution. It focuses on different trends in writing history, and analyses the possi-
bilities to use ‘coincidence’ as an interpretative tool in each of them. In doing so,
this article discusses counterfactual historical analysis (‘what if history’), deter-
minist views of history and their relation to speculative philosophy of history,
‘cliodynamics’ and ‘big history’. It ultimately argues for historical accounts that pay
attention to both the large processes that are likely to lead to certain trajectories, and
the enormous number of micro-causes that triggered the events as they happened.
Coincidence might fall outside of the analysis of (macro-) historians who are
looking for a comprehensive view of historical processes, but could still play a
proper role in thinking about historical trajectories.
1 Introduction: Coincidence and Comparisons
Historians try to interpret the past. They do so by analysing patterns in human
behaviour in earlier periods of time. In some ways, that excludes ‘coincidence’ as an
interpretative tool. The word ‘coincidence’, after all, derives from the Latin cum
incidere, which means ‘happening together’. Most historians take this to imply that
coincidences are events that seem closely related but lack a causal relationship. They
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just happen to occur at (roughly) the same time, or in a similar mode. This makes
them, at ﬁrst sight, less suitable as a historical explanatory notion.1 This rather
negative meaning of the word ‘coincidence’ in a historical context is best exem-
pliﬁed by the among American historians infamous list of ‘creepy coincidences’
between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. The coincidences in question
range from ‘the names Lincoln and Kennedy both contain seven letters’ to ‘both
presidents were shot in the head on a Friday before a major holiday’. The challenge
to professional historians is then to explain this set of coincidences. Since the sort of
similarities assembled on the list can be drawn between any historical ﬁgures, these
‘coincidences’ only amass to ‘pseudo-historical demonstrations of data-massaging’
(Kern and Brown 2001, p. 534). What lacks is any attempt to explain the (historical)
signiﬁcance of these similarities, meaning that they do not usefully contribute to
modes of interpreting past events.
This is not to say that analysing similarities in itself is something that is con-
demned by modern historians. In fact, comparing and contrasting individuals or
societies which seem similar in their structural set-out but have only limited inter-
relation is one of the methodological starting points of comparative history. By
comparing given individuals, institutes or areas, core aspects of speciﬁc phenomena
can become clearer. But it is tacitly acknowledged that the historical relevance of
these similarities needs to be explained, in terms of cause and effect, for them to be
useful as a historical term. This can be explicitly contrasted with ‘coincidental’
similarities, as is clear from a recent overview of the progress of historical schol-
arship by J.H. Elliott. Elliott reflects on his earlier comparative study of the two
seventeenth-century statesmen cardinal Richelieu and the Count Duke of Olivares, in
which he noted several similarities between the two, one of the more trivial being that
both men were third sons of noble fathers, ﬁnding employment in the service of a
monarch. ‘But’, he observes, ‘this simple fact suggests one of the problems inherent
in comparative history. Are we dealing here with coincidence, or does the similarity
point to some wider consideration that is worthy of note?’ (Elliott 2012, p. 180;
Elliott 1991). Coincidences in themselves, clearly, are not deemed noteworthy.
Both Olivares and Richelieu received an early education for an ecclesiastical
career. The death of Olivares’ older brother meant that Olivares became head of the
family and needed to marry. Unwillingness of Richelieu’s older brother Alphonse
to become bishop meant that Richelieu would make a career in the church. Elliott
describes the developments in their respective families as ‘an initial coincidence’
but one that ‘went on to create a number of similarities’, which he does consider ‘of
obvious signiﬁcance’, such as the influence of neo-Stoic philosophy on their actions
as statesmen. He contrasts these to ‘other coincidences’ that ‘may lead to a dead
end’, although even such ‘chance resemblances’ can help sharpening the mind
(Elliott 2012, p. 180–1). There is clear differentiation here between (if no real
deﬁnition of) what is deemed relevant for explaining actions and events, and what is
1For the development leading to the exclusive use of cum incidere as coincidence, see Vogt
(2011), pp. 43–66 followed by a discussion of the Greek Tyche.
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deemed merely anecdotal, and without explanatory power. Something is either ‘a
mere coincidence’ or, more often encountered within historical scholarship, ‘not a
coincidence’, and therefore relevant.
Coincidence, in this reading, becomes something that does not ﬁt into a his-
torical narrative, mainly because historians, as a very recent Manifesto formulated:
‘focus on the question of how: Who did the changing, and how can we be sure they
were the agents? These analytics of causality, action, and consequence make them
specialists in noticing the change around us’ (Guldi and Armitage 2014, p. 14).
Notions that happened to happen but (the agency of which) cannot be explained fall
outside of such a view of historical analysis. If (human) agency is a core interest,
the question of coincidence becomes linked to discussions about the randomness of
human behaviour or about free will (see the articles of Weitzel and Rosenkranz,
Thijssen and Loy, and Van Elk, Friston and Bekkering in this volume), neither of
which cohere easily with the attention (or competence) of most historians.
There is also an aspect of scale involved. Whether a historian interprets some-
thing as coincidental to, or a central focus of causality of, events depends somewhat
on the historical scope of his or her analysis. The education of historical ﬁgures, for
example, may explain their historical actions. Few biographers would formulate
their protagonist’s education as ‘mere coincidence’, but for a historian who is
interested in larger historical trajectories, the education that a single individual
happened to have had, and which may explain speciﬁc actions that were part of a
wider chain of events, has much less explanatory force. In such a reading the
deﬁnition of historical coincidence becomes almost a matter of taste. To be more
precise: the choice for the scale of a speciﬁc historical narrative decides whether
certain events are coincidental to the history which is being described, or causal
factors within that history. This relation between historical coincidence and the
scale of writing history is at the focus of this contribution.
2 Contingency, Causality and Counterfactuality
As must be clear from the above, there is certainly some space for coincidence as a
factor in historical explanation. There is a number of semi-synonyms that feature
somewhat more frequently in modern historiography, among which ‘accident’,
‘singular event’, ‘chance’ and ‘contingent circumstances’ are especially noticeable.
The term ‘luck’ also features, but mainly as a (rather self-effacing) explanation for
success in the career trajectory of a particular historian, or as part of cautionary
reflections on the ways in which processes which are difﬁcult to influence or trace
have influenced historical discoveries. (DuPont Chandler 2004; McClellan III 2005;
Cushing 1992). Luck, it seems, can be allowed to have influenced individual his-
torians, but is not explicitly acknowledged as a factor in the historical processes that
these historians investigate.
The situation seems different when ‘contingency’ is mentioned. There is a
long-standing strand of historical research that deals with ‘turning points’, and at
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some of these turning points, in a famous dictum by the great British historian
George M. Trevelyan ‘history failed to turn’.2 The notion that events may have
‘failed to turn as expected is to admit the role of contingency, the element of chance
—randomness’ (Post 2009). This has ultimately led to a flourishing (though not
uncontested) strand of historical analysis which is known as ‘virtual history’ or
‘counterfactual history’. The question posed by historians in this form of research is
‘what would have happened if events at a certain turning point would have gone
marginally differently’. Even before explicit attention to such counterfactuality, this
had been an implicit mode of reasoning within scholarly historical works, going
back at least to the Roman historian Livy’s analysis of how a war between the
armies of Alexander the Great and Rome would have played out (Ab Urbe Condita
9.17–19; Morello 2002). Perhaps the most famous example of modern implicit
historical use of counterfactuality is the statement by the German historian Eduard
Meyer in his Geschichte des Altertums that if the Persians had beaten the Greeks
(especially the Athenians) at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC European culture
would have developed entirely differently:
Das Endergebniss wäre schliesslich doch gewesen, dass eine Kirche und ein durchge-
bildetes theologisches System dem griechischen Leben und Denken ihr Joch aufgelegt und
jede freiere Regung in Fesseln geschlagen hätte, dass auch die neue griechische Kultur so
gut wie die orientalischen ein theologisch-religiöses Gepräge erhalten hätte.3
This line of arguing was recognised as ‘counterfactual’ by Max Weber, who
started his career as an ancient historian. Shortly after the publication of Meyer’s
work, he noted how the argument that the development of European history would
have shifted dramatically with a different outcome of the battle at Marathon rested
on a series of assumptions. Meyer argued that a Persian victory would have blocked
the preconditions for Athenian supremacy, and with it (still according to Meyer) the
development of democracy and rationality. Weber showed the analogies that stood
at the basis of the argument (Persian behaviour elsewhere), and showed the
methodological pitfalls within such a line of argument. Meyer’ conclusions were
less at stake than his methods, as is clear from the title of Weber’s 1905 essay that
has become justly famous: ‘Objective possibility and adequate causation in his-
torical explanation’. In it, Weber questions
how the attribution of a concrete result to a single ‘cause’ is… feasible… given that… it is
always an inﬁnity of causal factors that brought about the single ‘event’.4
2Trevelyan (1918), p. 79. The quote is often contributed to Taylor (1945), p. 71, who describes
Germany in the contexts of the revolutions in 1848: ‘German history reached its turning-point and
failed to turn’.
3Meyer (1901), 446: ‘The end result would ultimately have been that a Church and a
well-developed theological system had brought the Greek life and thought under their yoke, and
placed chains on any aspiration to freedom; that the new Greek culture, much like oriental culture,
would have had a theological-religious character’.
4Weber (1905) with the comments by Ringer (2002). Cf. also Huizinga (1937), p. 137.
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The answer is counterfactual reasoning, by which, Weber argued, it becomes
possible to conjecturally sort and rank different possible causes. The historian can
take various events out of the equation, and then conjecture what the new historical
trajectory would be. This makes it possible to see which potential causes would
have brought about which effect. Causality and intention are at issue here. The
crucial Weberian terms are ‘objective probability’ and ‘adequate causation’:
Where an actual result was brought about by a complex of antecedent conditions that made it
‘objectively probable’, the ‘cause’ is termed ‘adequate’ in relation to the ‘effect’. Where a
causal factor contributed to a historically interesting aspect of an outcome without being
‘adequate’ in this sense, it may be considered its ‘accidental cause’ (Ringer 2002, pp. 165–6).
The ‘accidental cause’ in the Weberian sense is of course not the same as coinci-
dence, but his line of arguing highlights an awareness that developments in history
could have gone differently, and that often events that seemed less directly relevant
may have had wide-ranging consequences. Noticeably, in Weber’s argument a
single concrete cause leads to one concrete effect, making it particularly important
for him to distinguish between causal and coincidental relations.
There is, in fact, an element of the counterfactual in almost all assumptions of
causality. If we argue that one event causes a second event, we also argue that the
second event would not have taken place (or at least not in that way) without the
ﬁrst. In that sense, there is little difference between ‘true’ causes and coincidences,
as the coincidence still caused later events to happen. It is here that scale becomes
an issue. Historians accept events as a ‘true’ cause if they ﬁt the size of their
narrative interest. If they are too ‘small’, they are often waylaid as coincidental, if
they are too ‘big’ they become background context. Whether a cause is deemed of
the right size depends on what the historian is trying to (re)construct. Within that
reconstruction, there are protagonists, turning points and contexts. The scale of the
historical trajectory decides which events are too small (coincidental) or too big
(background). In that sense, a historical coincidence is a cause (in the counterfactual
sense) which is without explanatory force within the chosen narrative framework.
This is an important background to so-called ‘what if’ history, which tends to
focus on causes that seem too small for the historical trajectory which is being
analysed—and therefore seem to suggest that coincidence plays a major part in
history. Such attention for (single) events that could have gone either way has had
numerous advocates in the 20th century. One of the earliest examples of what
ultimately grew to be a proper genre of counterfactional history is a collection of
essays by professional historians called If It Had Happened Otherwise, which best
claim to fame is the inclusion of an essay by Winston Churchill on what would have
happened if Lee had won the Battle of Gettysburg.5 For much of the remainder of
the 20th century these essays were mainly influential on writers of ﬁction, lying at
the base of the genre of ‘alternate history/reality’.
5Squire (1931). Cf. Hacker and Chamberlain (1981), with an overview of early examples of
counterfactual history, and now Gallagher (2011).
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Yet, some historians also engaged with this line of thinking, and recognised that
the ultimate consequence of it would be that ‘the course of the world’s history
depends on accidents’. Notably, the historian and classicist J.B. Bury devoted an
essay on contingency, starting with the importance of the shape of Cleopatra’s nose.
If this nose had not been so attractive, the argument went, Mark Antony would not
have been so distracted as to lose the pivotal battle at Actium (31 BC) against the
later emperor Augustus. Of course, the ‘shape of Cleopatra’s nose was rightly
conditioned by the causal sequence of her heredity’, but since this causal link had
nothing to do with causal links determining the politics of Ancient Rome, the
‘collision’ of these two unrelated sequences, in Bury’s view, boiled down to
chance: ‘the valuable collision of two or more independent chains of causes’. He
reﬁnes this deﬁnition by differentiating between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ contingencies:
If Napoleon at an early stage in his career had been killed by a meteorite, that would have
been the purest of pure contingencies … The meteorite was completely disinterested in his
death.6
This emphasis on the role of chance on historical processes led to what has been
coined the ‘accidental view of history’, which opposed notion of historical
inevitability (Berenson 1952, 88). It was embraced by, amongst others, the
philosopher Isaiah Berlin. In his essay on ‘Historical inevitability’, he argued
strongly for recognition of the role of accidents in history, which he placed in
opposition to the (in his thoughts) determinist philosophies of history of Marx and
Hegel, to which we will return later in this essay. According to Berlin, explaining
human behaviour in terms of causality denied free will, and falsely absolved his-
torians of the task to morally evaluate historical actors: ‘to assess degrees of their
responsibility, to attribute this or that consequence to their free decision, to set them
up as examples or deterrents, to seek to derive lessons from their lives’.
Recognising that there are accidents that influence the course of events, and that
only these, ‘force majeure—being unavoidable—are necessarily outside the cate-
gory of responsibility and consequently beyond the bounds of criticism’.7
This view of history, and of the role of the historian, was famously opposed by
the historian and diplomat E.H. Carr, who took issue with ‘Cleopatra’s Nose’ in his
influential What is History. Carr explicitly argued against those who ‘pointed out
the absurdity of failing to recognise the role of accident in history’, singling out
Berlin whom he blames for talking nonsense (conceding that he did so ‘in an
engaging and attractive way’) and for flogging ‘this very dead horse back into a
semblance of life’. Berlin’s (and Karl Popper’s) opposition to a deterministic
outlook in history, with their emphasis on chance, was in Carr’s view little more
than ‘a parlour game with the might-have-beens of history’ (Carr 1961, pp. 92–99).
The role of the historian is to recognise patterns of historical signiﬁcance:
6Bury (1916/1930), pp. 60 (course of history), 61 (chance), 62 (heredity), 67 (Napoleon).
7Berlin (1954/2012), pp. 119–190, citing Berenson (p. 119), discussing the importance of moral
judgement (pp. 140–142), and discussing force majeure (p. 146).
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Just as from the inﬁnite ocean of facts the historian selects those which are signiﬁcant for
his purpose, so from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect he extracts those, and
only those, which are historically signiﬁcant; and the standard of historical signiﬁcance is
his ability to ﬁt them into his pattern of rational explanation and interpretation. Other
sequences of cause and effect have to be rejected as accidental, not because the relation
between cause and effect is different, but because the sequence itself is irrelevant. The
historian can do nothing with it; it is not amenable to rational interpretation, and has no
meaning either for the past or the present (Carr 1961, p. 105).
For a long time, Carr’s criticisms made ‘what-if-history’ suspect for serious
scholars. But counterfactual constructions of historical developments have blos-
somed as an academic branch of writing history since the publication of Ferguson
(1997). Ferguson, like Bury and especially Berlin before him, ultimately tries to
take distance from deterministic views of historical processes (Marxism prime
amongst them) and aims to show how a limited set of changes, in which contingent
factors would have changed crucial outcomes, would have resulted in an almost
unrecognisable historical trajectory; a ‘virtual history’ for the period 1646–1996.
There have, almost inevitably, been counter-reactions, most noticeably by
Richard Evans (2014), written at least partly to explain his ‘initial, somewhat
allergic reaction’ (p. xvi) to counterfactuals. Evans argues amongst other that the
impression that history could have developed in a radically different way by a
combination of minor moments of chance will challenge interest in what really
happened, and ‘allows historians to rewrite history according to their present-day
political purposes and prejudices’ (p. 63). Moreover, Evans argues, counterfactual
thinking does not, in fact, function well
as a vehicle for overcoming “determinism”, in the sense of the prioritization of larger
historical forces over smaller, personal, chance, and contingent events and circumstances
(Evans 2014, p. 104).
By selecting a ﬁnite number of ‘alternative outcomes that were at least plausible’,
counterfactual studies, according to Evans, highlight the importance of forces
beyond individual control. Noticeably, Evans’ criticism of these ‘altered pasts’ does
not focus on the existence and importance of chance events as such within the
functioning of history, but on the assumption that one minor alteration in the
historical timeline would cascade towards major changes over a prolonged period
of time. In Evans’ view, history is not necessarily ﬁxed, but historians should not
have the liberty to adapt it as they see ﬁt (Evans 2014, p. 46).
Criticism on counterfactual history is not quite the same as criticism on coun-
terfactual thinking within historical analyses, which is much less disputed. Indeed,
the above-mentioned History Manifesto sees historical expertise in counterfactual
thinking as an important asset for answering questions of sustainability, and pos-
sibly other problems that are acute in modern society (Guldi and Armitage 2014,
pp. 31–4, with Booth 2003 and Thompson 2010). Such a use of counterfactual
history partly closes the gap between counterfactual history and counterfactual
analysis. The latter aims to draw clear distinctions between causal and coincidental
relations, but does not suggest alternative trajectories. It also tries to apply coun-
terfactual analysis on events that are of the ‘right’ scale.
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‘What if’ history clearly does suggest alternative trajectories, but the suggestion in
the Manifesto seems to lean more towards using counterfactuality as a mode of
drawing distinctions. There is, in any case, a burgeoning of recent literature discussing
the importance of counterfactual history, in which the plausibility of the selection of
historical changes is placed at the fore. If historical alternatives are grounded in
probability they are deemed to be ‘good reasoning’. If not, they are not (Bunzl 2004,
p. 845). Ultimately, coincidence in one form of the other lies at the basis of these
‘imagined’ historical developments. Something in the past needed to have gone dif-
ferently. But the emphasis seems less on the importance of that ‘coincidence’ than on
the plausibility of the counterfactual consideration: how likely is it that something
would have gone differently. History may not be predetermined, but randomness is
still kept in check. Coincidence has its role, but is not used as an interpretive tool.
3 Coincidence and the Construction of a Clear Course
of History
As stated above, at least some of the historians promoting counterfactual thinking,
and emphasising the importance of contingency in an ‘accidental view of history’,
did so in reaction to a determinist perspective. One of the ‘determinist’ views that
leaves least scope for chance is the one that sees historical events as the result of
divine providence. As formulated in the late-nineteenth century: ‘History, when
written rightly, is but a record of Providence; and he who would read history
rightly, must read it with his eyes constantly on God’ (Read 1862, p. 4). Very few
historians, none taken seriously, would now present an academic historical analysis
in such stark terms. Yet, there is still a noticeable absence for coincidence as a real
factor in interpreting history among the various approaches that look at the larger
schemes of history, ranging from speculative philosophy of history to
macro-historical explanations and long-term causes.
Speculative philosophy of history is in a way similar to Read’s notion of ‘a
record of Providence’. The ultimate trajectory is considered a given, and the process
is then interpreted in historical terms. Thus, Hegelian dialectics assume that history
follows a speciﬁc trajectory, through ‘thesis’ (historical developments) and the
resulting ‘antithesis’ (historical reaction) to synthesis until history fulﬁls itself. In
that sense: ‘world history exhibits nothing other than the plan of providence’ (Hegel
1807/1977). Hegel, as opposed to Read, might still be able to accept that chance
occurrences were part of history, and will have influenced the lives of historical
individuals over the course of time. These occurrences, however, were not signif-
icant in the greater scheme of things. They do not ﬁt the size of the framework in
which he places his historical narrative. Hegel’s large-scale path of history is
inevitable, and though it allows for coincidences to have happened, coincidence as
a concept is excluded as a relevant mode of interpretation.
In fact, all forms of history run some risk of taking a determinist point of view in
that too often an historical argument is geared towards the known outcome of a
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historical process. In the famous dictum by Schlegel: ‘Der Historiker ist ein
rückwärts gekehrter Prophet’. In its extreme form, this way of working leads to
so-called ‘Whig history’ in which the present is seen as the inevitable (and desir-
able) outcome of historical progress. Such a presupposition results in loosing track
of roads not taken or dead ends.8 The risk of falling in that methodological trap
seems to be larger when the scope of the historical argument is wider. Applied at a
cosmic scale, this appears to be at the basis of the so-called ‘Fine Tuning
Argument’, debunked by Landsman in his contribution to this volume.
There have of course been (and still are) nuanced, and influential, interpretations of
history by historians that focus on the structuring factors of human behaviour through
the ages. Best known, and a school of thought to which the likes of Popper and Berlin
reacted, is Marxism. Interestingly enough, Marxism is not prominent in current dis-
cussions on determinism in analytical philosophy. It does, however, feature with near
inevitability in debates regarding macro-historical scholarship (Adcock 2007, p. 351–2).
Following Popper’s criticisms, Marxism (much like the ‘speculative philosophies’ of
the likes of Hegel or Spengler) is sometime described as a form of ‘historicism’, which
is then presented as an inflexible method of predicting the ‘future course of human
history’. The term ‘historicism’ is, however, more commonly associated with the
notions of the famous nineteenth-century historians Ranke and Humboldt, in which the
historical notions are in continuous flux. Historical ideas and historical developments
deﬁne the nature of institutions or states and are the historicists object of study
(Ankersmit 1995, p. 143; Vogt 2011, pp. 367–92 and 495–502). To avoid confusion,
this chapter will avoid the massive debates about the different sorts of historicism, and
formulate the argument in a context of determinism and macro-history.
It is important to note the difference in the deterministic aspects of Marxist
scholarship, and the absolute ‘hand of god’, and slightly less absolute Hegelian
dialectics, with which this section opened. Marxist views of history, in a simpliﬁed
form, assert that there is an inevitable sequence within societies (‘social forma-
tions’) which depends on inter linkage between ‘modes of productions’ (economic
systems) and internal conflicts (‘contradictions’) (Burke 1992, pp. 141–4). This
certainly implies economic determinism; the notion that economic causes determine
human events, or at least have a primary role in explaining outcomes. Such
mono-causal explanations of historical events are looked at with suspicion by most
modern historians, which partly explains the bogey-man role Marxism has come to
play for those arguing against determinist points of view. Does Marxist theory also
imply historical determinism? Much, as always, depends on deﬁnition:
When unpacked more fully this belief [historical determinism] is usually interpreted as a
substantive claim that the aggregate course of major historical events traces a structured
process of successive changes unfolding inevitably through the events of the past, present,
and onto the future (Adcock 2007, pp. 352–4).
8F. V. Schlegel, Athenaeum 1798.2, 20: ‘The historian is a prophet looking backwards’. Whig
history: Mayr (1990). The term ‘Whig history’ was coined by Butterﬁeld (1931). A recent con-
tribution on coincidence in history, discussed further below, stresses the importance for historians
to keep an open mind regarding the course history did not take: Nijhuis (2003).
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This excludes the possibility that coincidence influences the ultimate—inevitable
—course of history.
Marxism’s certainty that civilization will progress from primitive communism to
the rise of private property and the development of an aristocracy, and then through
feudalism and capitalism to true socialism/communism ﬁts that deﬁnition of his-
torical inevitability. Yet Marxism leaves scope for (temporary) developments that
do not ﬁt its pattern of history, such as the ‘refeudilization’ of Spain and Italy, and
for individual actions or exogenous explanations to decide the pace if not the course
of history. Coincidence, in these contexts, is possible and may influence the course
of history. Within a smaller scale of analysis, ‘coincidence’ is deemed acceptable.
But it does not influence the outcome of the large-scale historical process. As an
explanatory notion it is irrelevant for the clear course of historical developments
that are at issue in Marxist (historical) thinking (Burke 1992, pp. 141–2).
Is the exclusion of coincidence as a ‘historical tool’ from such large views of
history inevitable? Elsewhere in this volume, De Kroon and Jongejans set out how,
when looking at the complexities of ecosystems, the scale of organisation is a
crucial factor in distinguishing between developments that appear unpredictable or
determined. Possibly, the same applies to the study of historical ‘systems’. Popper’s
and Berlin’s sustained attack on Hegel and Marx, combined with the economic
determinism in Marxist theory and its resulting mono-causality, has made the mere
mention of historical determinism suspect. Yet, already half a century ago Ernst
Nagel countered many of Berlin’s objections to determinism as such. The central
philosophical premise of determinism—every human event is the effect of ante-
cedent causes—does not, he held, necessarily imply a claim about inevitably
structured patterns in history as a whole (Nagel 1966). In fact, historical narratives
can easily be construed as a sequence of events, in which speciﬁc actions were the
trigger for subsequent events. Tracing a ‘series of causal mechanics’ can form the
basis of relevant historical explanations (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). With
relative frequency, recent attempts at macro-historical explanations of the past have
been criticised ‘for displaying unjustiﬁed determinism’. Yet macro-history (or even
determinism) is not in itself incompatible with explanations that include causal
complexity or choice. Like we saw in this contribution so far, and was made clear in
the contribution of De Kroon and Jongejans, much depends upon the level at which
we are analysing (or narrating) the historical system:
Truly stochastic (i.e. unpredictable) dynamics may ﬁnd their origin in underlying deter-
ministic processes, while stochastic interactions at a local scale may give rise to relatively
stable (and hence predictable) dynamics at a global scale.
Even contingency, it seems, can be included in a macro-historical approach, if
contingency effectively means contingent upon causes that cannot be explained by
current theory (Adcock 2007, p. 347; pp. 354–5). So it seems that there is theo-
retically nothing that blocks a macro-historical approach that incorporates contin-
gency, if not perhaps coincidence, as an interpretive framework.
Indeed, the History Manifesto, which, as we have already seen, advocated the
use of counterfactual thinking among historians, also makes a bold statement for the
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return of ‘grand sweeps of history’, emphasising the importance of larger historical
models—Braudel’s longue durée—for modern society. Yet it warns that the
timescale should still be such ‘that historians can do what they what they do best:
comparing different kinds of data side by side’. Only then can multiple causality be
stressed, showing that ‘the reality of natural laws’ nor ‘the predominance of pattern’
is ultimately decisive. Individuals can choose (Guldi and Armitage 2014, pp. 52–
60). Historical events may be decided by such complex combinations of causes that
‘contingency’ should be incorporated in an historical analysis. Still, looking at
historical developments in the longest-term perspective raises the risks of losing
sight of contingency. As famously set out by A.J.P. Taylor: ‘every road accident is
caused, in the last resort, by the invention of the internal combustion engine and by
men’s desire to get from one place to another… But a motorist, charged with
dangerous driving, would be ill-advised if he pleaded the existence of motor cars as
his sole defence’ (Taylor 1961, pp. 102–3, paraphrased by Guldi and Armitage
2014, p. 57).
4 Coincidence, Big History and Accidental Cause
Scale, it seems, is a relevant if not necessarily decisive factor in the extent to which
coincidence can be included in an analysis of historical processes. At the same time,
we have seen theManifesto’s plea to reclaim the telling of large historical narratives
as a skill for professional historians. That attempt has much to do with the influence
of discussions about human history by non-historians. Prime among them is Jared
Diamond. Diamond (2005) is mentioned by Guldi and Armitage (2014), 57 as ‘a
gripping account of the fates of societies stricken by plague, mixing archaeological
evidence with the history of species extinction and ethnic deracination’, though it is
simultaneously noted that the work lacks the engagement with detail that charac-
terises the works of some recent historians. More influential than Diamond (2005) is
Diamond (1997).9 It is a key example of a successful account of long-term his-
torical processes. But it is not written by a historian, nor does it refer to writings by
historians. The time-scale, also, is wholly different. Where the largest scope of a
macro-historical analysis by a historian focuses on 3,000 years, Diamond’s ‘big
history’ covers more than 13,000 years.10
At the core of Diamond’s book lies the theory that the main reason for Eurasian
dominance in history has to do with environmental advantages. Physical geography
9This book has amassed prizes (amongst which the Pulitzer and the Aventis Prize), sold in
enormous numbers, and was ﬁlmed by National Geographic. It has become so well-known that
Mitt Romney attempted to use the book to support one of his claims in the 2012 American
presidential campaign, which led to a published reaction by Diamond in the New York Times,
followed by a host of tweets and articles: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/opinion/mitt-
romneys-search-for-simple-answers.html, visited on 20.3.2015.
10The term ‘Big history’ was coined by Christian (2004).
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underlies historical developments. In Diamond’s own words, European historical
dominance resulted from
accidents of geography and biogeography—in particular to the continent’s different areas,
axes, and suites of wild plant and animal species. This is, the different historical trajectories of
Africa and Europe stem ultimately from differences in real estate (Diamond 1997, p. 401).11
The book is well written and an extremely rewarding read, but its very strong
reading of historical processes and near-negation of human agency has led to
continuous critical reactions. One returning feature in that criticism is Diamond’s
exclusion of cultural autonomy. The environmental historian J. R. McNeill for-
mulated his objections to this emphatically, in an exchange of views with Diamond
in the New York Review of Books (May 15, 1997)
Much more powerfully than any other species, [humans] change the environment around
us; and have done so ever since our ancestors began to control ﬁre and to use tools. Learned
behavior, channeled along innumerable different paths by divergent cultures, is what allows
us to do so. Human beings do indeed often “approach limits imposed by environmental
constraints” only to ﬁnd a way to overcome and escape those constraints, as the history of
technology repeatedly illustrates.12
A second, related, point of criticism is that of the book’s apparently linked
geographic and historical determinism:
At its worst, it develops an argument about human inequality based on a deterministic logic
that reduces social relations such as poverty, state violence, and persistent social domi-
nation, to inexorable outcomes of geography and environments (Correia 2013, p. 1).
One can discuss the merits of and problems with Guns, Germs and Steel at
length. For the purposes of this article, however, it is especially interesting to
compare the outlook of history in the book to that of Marxism as discussed above,
and note the reactions by professional historians. Marx’s economic determinism fed
a form of historical determinism, leading to critical reactions by historians both
because of the mono-causal explanation of the course of history, and because of the
absence of human agency. Replace ‘economic’ with ‘geographic’ and the outline of
argument and reaction is the same for Guns, Germs and Steel, again an approach to
history written by a non-historian. The comparison goes awry at several levels, but
both theories deny coincidence the power to influence the outcome of historical
trajectories. Diamond’s dialogue with McNeill is telling:
11Note how, in some ways, Diamond seems to work from a ‘ﬁrst cause’, the existence of which is
not further explained. The underlying geographies of the world are, in Diamond’s own words:
‘accidents’. This is, however, a very different mode of using coincidence as an instrument in
historical analysis than the one this chapter is interested in.
12http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/26/guns-germs-and-steel/, visited on 20.3.
2015.
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Yet the emergence of such [literate] societies in Eurasia was no accident. It had long
antecedents with clear environmental causes … over the hundreds of generations of
post-Ice Age human history, and over a large continent’s thousands of societies, cultural
differences become sifted to approach limits imposed by environmental constraints.13
Clear courses of history seem to leave little room for coincidence as an interpre-
tative tool—and even less so if human agency is excluded.
5 Coincidence and Cliodynamics
Not all large-scale narratives of human history exclude the importance of agency or
coincidence. Yet there is an inherent tension between the drive towards explaining
long-term dynamical processes in history and attention to individual human actions.
This comes clearly forward in the recently developed school of thought called
Cliodynamics, consisting mainly of sociologists with an historical interest. Its
agenda is to recognise ‘laws of history’:
Cliodynamics (from Clio, the muse of history, and dynamics, the study of temporally
varying processes) is the new transdisciplinary area of research at the intersection of his-
torical macrosociology, economic history/cliometrics, mathematical modeling of long-term
social processes, and the construction and analysis of historical databases … ultimately the
aim is to discover general principles that explain the functioning and dynamics of actual
historical societies.14
Unsurprisingly, ‘coincidence’ does not feature in ‘Cliodynamic’ scholarship, into
which some of the recent scholarship of Jared Diamond might also be included
(Diamond and Robinson 2010, with Thomas 2010). What Cliodynamics aims at are
general principles, explaining how historical societies developed and functioned.
Binding the various scholarship within this new subdiscipline of historical sciences
is (1) attention for the general principles that explain the dynamics of societies, that
lead to (2) models, often formulated in mathematical terms, which are the con-
fronted with (3) empirical content. The data from historical societies are used to
develop general patterns, and test the accuracy of assumption from the models. Data
from (other) historical societies can then be used to test the model predictions. The
basic assumption is that history can be modelled, and that these models can help us
‘predict’ what happened in individual societies (Turchin 2011).
At ﬁrst sight, attempts to discover ‘laws of history’ would seem to side with the
above-discussed systems of deterministic history. The much more speciﬁc attention
to modelling in this new approach to large-scale historical processes, however,
allows randomness to be systematically incorporated into thinking about these
historical processes. In brief, the main purpose of Cliodynamic scholarship is to
13http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/26/guns-germs-and-steel/, visited on 20.3.
2015.
14http://cliodynamics.info/.
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develop a highly sophisticated model to describe historical societies. The model
includes a range of (competing) general principles that are ‘translated’ into sys-
tematic regularities, which can then be described as ‘structural events’. Some of
these events are predictable and can be modelled. Some events cannot. Which is
where randomness comes in.
In the terms just described, randomness is a modelling device. There are
developments and actions that are excluded from the model, in order to make events
understandable. The reason to exclude them can be because the actions cannot be
predicted (because, for instance, they follow from the human free will), or because
the predictable causes behind the actions are unknown to the scholar designing the
model, or, ﬁnally, because these causes are known but too complex for the model.
The absence of these actions from the model does not deny that both structural and
non-structural forces are continuously operating within societies and should be
included in a perfect model. But describing the unknowable/unknown/too complex
aspects of historical processes as ‘random’ allows the model to function, and gives
the scholar possibilities to differentiate between structural forces and factors that are
now described as random. Almost all authors working within this framework deﬁne
human agency as ‘random’ (Goldstone 2003; Skocpol 2003).
The underlying assumption is one of complex causality, in which there is dif-
ferentiation between structural causes and triggering events. In terms of the model,
these triggering events might be ‘random’, but that does not deny them their place
of importance. These triggering events are, however, difﬁcult to predict. The
underlying ‘macro-causes’ amplify these triggering notions (‘micro-causes’), in
which agency is crucial. Agency is essential, but not really what this ﬁeld of study
is particularly interested in. Instead, the structural causes underlying the effects of
the triggering events are focus of attention. Randomness is accepted, but the interest
is in the grand ‘mechanisms’ of societal change (Turchin 2006). Coincidence is not
really denied, but it is certainly pushed to the background. There seems to be little
attention to the role of coincidence in history when non-historians pose the ques-
tions—and it is certainly not used as a mode of interpretation.
6 Coincidence as an Interpretative Tool?
Might there be a mode to include coincidence as an interpretative tool in historical
research, in light of the above brief overview? It seems clear that if such a notion
can be used, it should give sufﬁcient attention to so-called micro-causes, in which
human agency is of great importance. Individuals have freedom to take speciﬁc
actions. They of course do so within socio-biological frameworks (see the contri-
butions by Weitzel and Rosenkranz and Van Elk, Friston and Bekkering) and
within the context of a larger historical frameworks, which is what macro-history
focuses on. However, as Ton Nijhuis recognised in a stimulating recent contribution
on exactly this topic—coincidence in history—the action chosen out of a range of
possible courses of action has influence on historical developments, and needs to be
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taken seriously. History was not a closed trajectory before it happened, and the
outcome that we happened to arrive at is not necessarily more worthwhile because
this is the course events took. Nijhuis draws the analogy between studying history
and walking in an unknown landscape. If you only look at the trodden path, you fail
to see the various avenues that you can take, and others could have taken (Nijhuis
2003, p. 63). In a macro-historical perspective, developments are homogenous and
continuous. In reality, there are heterogeneous and discontinuous serial events, that
only the analysis of micro-history can make visible. In this context both Isaiah
Berlin and the well-known Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg have used Tolstoy’s
War and Peace as an example. Tolstoy assumed that ‘a historical phenomenon can
become comprehensible only by reconstructing the activities of all the persons who
participated in it’ (Ginzburg et al. 1993, p. 24; Berlin 1978). In the intersection
between private actions and the public world, history develops. For a systematic
recognition of the role of coincidence in history, our analysis needs to be at the right
scale. It needs to value human agency, and the stochastic element this brings into
historical developments, whilst at the same time identifying the underlying pro-
cesses which may be much more predictable.
The ideal historical account should take both into consideration, going back and
forth between the large processes that are likely to lead to certain trajectories, and
the enormous number of micro-causes that triggered the events as they happened. In
that context, one might be able to usefully employ the famous thought experiment
of the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould:
I call this experiment “replaying life’s tape”: You press the rewind button and, making sure
you thoroughly erase everything that has actually happened, go back to any place in the
past … Then let the tape run again and see if the repetition looks at all like the original.15
Gould’s work has been intensely discussed (and occasionally maligned), but the
metaphor of replaying the tape might be a way of coming to grips with the relation
between coincidence as an interpretive tool and discussion on the size of history.
How likely do we deem certain historical events if they were to be played out
again? To what extent does that depend on the scale of the historian’s narrative?
How often would Antony’s distraction with Cleopatra’s nose lead him to lose the
battle at Actium if we were to reply the events of 2 September 31 BC? Would it be
in the region of 2 out of 10.000 times (a contingent chain of events) or 9998 out of
10.000 (quasi-determined)? And might the result be different depending on our
perspective? If we were to replay the whole year 31 BC, or the longer period of 44–
31 BC, would that decrease the likelihood that this chain of events were to happen
again? This could be a way to start recognising the possible role of coincidence in
various ‘triggering events’. Coincidence might fall outside of the interpretative
toolbox of the sociologists and macro-historians who are looking for a compre-
hensive view of historical processes, but could still play a proper role in thinking
15Gould (1989), 48, with the discussion in Vogt, Kontingenz und Zufall, 231–234. The possi-
bilities of using Gould’s thoughts for my argument, and their possible repercussions in this
context, were kindly pointed out to me by Robert-Jan Wille.
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about historical trajectories. Not ‘what if’ history exactly, but rather history with an
open mind.
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